I don't claim to be able to do much better than the other phenomenalists who have tried to persuade functionalists, but I do have a couple of ideas that I haven't seen discussed before. At the moment these ideas are rather vague---not much more than some massaging of intuitions. I don't expect them to be particularly convincing out of the box, so to speak, but they are the reasons that I am a phenomenalist, and I think that there is a chance that these proto-arguments can be evolved into more compelling arguments in the future.
The first of my reasons for believing in qualia, I call the ``Existence Reason'': If the Harman's fixed-up account is correct, then what reason do I have to exist? With the functionalist account, it is not clear to me why existence would be better than nonexistence.
Let me elaborate: If I am nothing more than a computer executing a certain program, why wouldn't it be just as good for me if I were that same program just sitting on a big piece of paper without actually executing? Or to take it even further, why even exist as scratchings on a piece of paper? Why not be happy just to exist in the pure mathematical space of possible programs?
To put this more allegorically, let's say that God came to you and said, ``Because you've led a good life, I'm going to do you a favor. I'm going to give you the opportunity to extend your lifespan to 5,000 years. And for all of these years you will live a life of opulence, peace, and good health. There's just one catch... In order to do this, I'll have to move you from this world, to a different possible world. And unfortunately this other possible world doesn't actually exist. But don't worry about that---that's just an unimportant detail. You have your choice: stay put or take me up on the offer.''
Clearly, this is not much of a choice because we know that being in the actual world is better than being in a nonexistent possible world. But why?
In my mind, the answer is qualia. It's infinitely better to have
qualia than to not have qualia (though I don't think I can muster up a
good argument for why that should be). A program sitting on a piece
of paper and programs existing only in the pure space of mathematical
possibility don't get qualia because that's not the way the bridge
laws from physical state to phenomenal state work.
I suppose that people living in a
nonexistent possible world can have qualia, but for reasons that I
can't articulate, these qualia are worthless as far as qualia go.
Only the qualia of beings existing in the actual world have the
essential property that they can make existence a property worth
having.
Unfortunately, for me, this argument is easily countered by the functionalist in a number of different ways. The most, obvious response is, ``Doug, what are you going on about? As far as I can see, you're just spouting nonsense. In order to have phenomenal properties you have to be an up and running computer program, and if you are just scrawled on a piece of paper or you don't exist, then you are not up and running, are you? There's nothing more that needs to be said.''
Since I readily admit that my argument is rather weak, there's not much I can say to this response, except to reiterate my question, ``What's so great about being up and running? What makes this better?'' And to agree with the sorry state of affairs for the poor phenomenalist like me who knows there must be some way to effectively express his intuitions, but just can't think of a good way to do so.
Another response available to the functionalist is to give some credence to my intuitions, but then bite the ``better'' bullet to refute them. This response might go like so: ``In fact, there is nothing better about existing than not existing. This belief is probably just an artifact of our evolution because it helps in our survival instinct. This persistent and widespread but ill-conceived belief in ``souls'' or ``qualia'' is also probably an artifact of our evolution. Just because evolution programmed us to have certain intuitions, however, doesn't mean that you should give in to them. Reason is all you need, and we've given you plenty of that to see through this qualia nonsense. Also, we can all agree that there is something different about existing and not existing. If you must bring ``better'' into this, then why not tie it directly to existence, rather than indirectly through these mythical and unnecessary qualia?''
Again, I have little to say in response. The functionalist position seems completely reasonable. I just know that it is wrong.
I do have a related reason that is somewhat better than the Existence Reason. I call this the ``Time Reason'': Physics, especially General Relativity with its prediction of closed time-like loops, seems to lead us to the conclusion that the present is not a special point in time. Normally we think of only the present as existing; the past no longer exists and the future doesn't exist yet. But General Relativity seems to push us in the direction that all points in time exist at all times, just as all points of space exist no matter where you happen to be, and there is no difference between the present and any other point in time. Intuitively, however, one's consciousness moves from the past to the future, and it only exists at one given point in time, making the present very special compared to other points in time. If there are no qualia, then we seemed to be forced into the conclusion that there is nothing special about the present. That consciousness residing at just one point in time is merely an illusion. That really our consciousness is not a dynamically changing thing---it's a static structure in spacetime. This conclusion seems completely wrong.
Once again, however, there is a functionalist response that leaves me silent: ``There's no conundrum here. If it turns out that all of spacetime still exists, then all conscious thoughts still exist. And if it turns out that only the present exists, then only conscious thoughts that are occurring now exist. What is supposed to be the problem here?
``If we have good reason to believe that the first of these possibilities is incoherent, then we would have good reason to believe that the formulation of spacetime, as it is typically conceived, is wrong. On the other hand, I see nothing incoherent with the idea that each of our consciousnesses is a static thing in spacetime. If you just think about how a complicated computer program works, it is obvious that at each point in time, the program will most likely be in a state that is unique to that point in time. If the program represents its own state, then it might represent time too, in order to help in representing its own state. Just as a robot needs to represent its position in space, it is likely to be quite useful for a a robot to also represent its position in time. It is this self-representation that gives the illusion of a dynamic consciousness, but there's no big mystery here.''
So, as things are now, I have to grant that the functionalists have the stronger hand. I'd like to point out, however, that this is what we should expect even if phenomenalism is true. We cannot expect direct evidence for the existence of qualia. At least you can't if you are an ``epiphenomenalist'', as I am. An epiphenomenalist believes that qualia are causally irrelevant. I am an epiphenomenalist because I see no way of making interactionism coherent (though I won't argue against interactionism here). If epiphenomenalism is true, then qualia have absolutely no objectively observable effect on the world we see around us. And if qualia exist but have no effect on the observable world, then it is clear that evidence that they do exist will be very hard to come by. Any evidence for the existence of qualia will have to be rather indirect, as the proto-arguments I have presented are.
So, let's say that my intuition massaging turns out to actually be effective in persuading functionalists. Or that these arguments are developed into something more formidable in the future. Or that another argument comes along that is able to establish the existence of qualia. Only once one of these occur, will the logical possibility of zombies be established.
Unfortunately, even once this very difficult task has been accomplished, there are several more steps in Chalmers' argument that need to be put through the wringer. Fortunately, I think that the rest of Chalmers argument is quite sound, but discussion of this will have to wait for another day.